The TV commentators seemed to want a low turnout. Even when it became clear that the poll was over 60%, they were saying how low that was compared to a General Election. The reason for this gloomy view was that a low turnout would undermine the result and give succour to the Tories as the bill makes its way through Westminster.
The gloom was totally unfounded. Considering that the register is almost a year out of date, that because of Diana’s death we had to squeeze ten days campaigning into three, that the media were still distracted even then, that the resources used were on a par with local rather than general elections, that it was held in a holiday period, and that the weather was poor, the turnout was good. Better still, 74% voted for a Scottish Parliament and 64% for tax powers.
Significantly for some, the percentage of the total electorate voting for the first question easily surpassed 40%. Though only a psychological hurdle this time around, this was the barrier that created great bitterness after it dismissed the 1979 referendum result, despite a majority having voted in favour.
The No No camp mostly resorted to scare tactics, although some of their campaigning undoubtedly had the effect of scaring people into voting Yes Yes. Thatcher’s visit was warmly welcomed by pro-devolution campaigners as an opportunity to remind people of one of the best arguments for a Scottish Parliament — the poll tax, which was imposed on Scotland a year before England and Wales.
One of the most unusual aspects of the campaign was the bonhomie between parties and individuals who have in the past been venomous rivals. Some people believe that a Scottish Parliament will show a different way of doing things, getting away from personal attacks, empty rhetoric and confrontation for its own sake. Others think this a sad delusion, and if comments from the likes of Calum McDonald MP (Western Isles) are anything to go by they are right. Before the count ended, he compared the SNP to midges (small but annoying and always there).
Even if not reflected in the higher echelons, activists’ experience of working together may have a lasting impact when coupled with the effects of the voting system, which is proportional within each Euro constituency (using Westminster seats for first past the post, plus seven additional members for top up). Typically, this will give a seat to any party that can get 5.9% of the vote in their area, and in some circumstances, they will get a seat with less than 5.5%. The Green Party surpassed this in the 1989 Euro elections, and the Scottish Socialist Alliance was halfway there in Glasgow in the General Election this year. Given that these were effectively protest votes for parties which had no real chance of election, we must expect to see more than four parties represented in a Scottish Parliament. Coupled with the different political climate, some realignment is also inevitable; the only questions are how much and when.
One crunch point will come when the Scottish Parliament first votes on tax increases. These are likely to be supported by Lib Dems, SNP and smaller parties, but Labour’s leadership has already given a no-tax commitment for the first years of a Scottish Parliament.
Questioned on this, Brian Wilson said that he did not think Labour would be in a minority when it opposed such increases. He didn’t say why. Labour is extremely unlikely to have a majority in the Scottish Parliament. To fend off tax increase proposals, they will almost certainly be relying on Tory votes. Such an alliance would soon get up a lot of peoples’ noses and to make it worse Labour’s commitment will be portrayed as one that has been imposed by Westminster.
In the long run, of course, the campaign partners have different aims. The SNP want what they call “Independence in Europe” (an oxymoron if ever there was one); the Lib Dems want a federal system; while the Scottish Labour Party, though setting the current agenda, includes many who would support extensions of the proposed powers.
The next big question is the impact of a Scottish Parliament on the rest of the UK. Not just Wales and London, but the English regions, many of which, despite less well-defined identities and little public discussion or campaigning on the issue, have shown percentage support for devolution running in the high thirties.
In Spain, devolved governments for Catalunya, Euskadi and Galicia led to the rest of Spain demanding their own regional assemblies. Could the same happen here?