Between War and Peace by Bew, Patterson and Teague (Lawrence and Wishart, £12.99) attempts to advocate a consensus solution to the situation in the North of Ireland. That and the involvement of the ILP-backed New Dialogue may put many people off delving deeper. That would be a mistake. It presents a useful detailed political and economic analysis. In a discussion one of the authors, Henry Patterson, commented, “It is making an intervention into a debate which might make a difference — unusual for a book.” Reflecting the views of the majority of the population of the North, the authors support full involvement of all parties in the current talks process, while not expecting them to succeed.
The book examines the importance of sections of the leadership of the republican movement wanting an end to political violence. Unlike the loyalists, the authors believe that republicans have more to lose if the current talks are successful, as they will produce a settlement clearly within the union. The Unionists would have to accept a North-South institutional dimension, but this would probably coincide with the Irish government removing their claim to jurisdiction over the North (though not their ultimate territorial claim).
The book draws a negative balance sheet of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, questioning when Britain last had a strategic interest in the North. Paul Bew told LLB that he believed the “objective of the Irish state was one of stability, not unity in the form of any imposition”. Waiting for the Catholic population of the North to overtake the Protestant one would take at least 25 years; this may be a long term aspiration of the Irish government and could lead to their accepting the status quo now. The recent General Election had, however, produced an unnaturally low Unionist turnout.
The authors believe that the Irish government’s optimistic hope that EMU would produce automatic economic success was overstated; they question what would happen if Ireland opts in and the UK opts out. While European Union would not produce any easy solutions, if both opt in there would be a strong element of economic and social harmonisation, whether the Unionists wanted this or not.
While the prospects for the Ulster Unionist Party are good, the question was whether Sinn Fein would continue to grow at the expense of the SDLP, despite the latter’s role as a major player in the peace process. Much depended on whether the republican movement split over the issue of violence, and “it was difficult to envisage the republican movement being kept together”.
One conclusion to the current talks — the use of a referendum by the British Government — was seen as a risky move. It could force people into a compromise or could be self-destructive and destroy all that had been gained. The activity in Ireland had to be seen in the context of the vote for a Scottish Parliament and the Government’s desire for UK decentralisation. Blair’s strategy for the North of Ireland was simply an extension of his strategy for the whole of the UK. Scotland’s vote had helped push Trimble into the talks and the Unionists may end up having to accept a devolved assembly as the only way to stay in the UK.
Because the book assumes that both nationalists/republicans and Unionists have the wrong perspective on the current situation, it is in danger at times of “holier-than-thou-ism”; its great strength, however, is its detailed historical, political and economic analysis, and for this it is certainly worth reading.
Orangeism: Myth and Reality (Connolly Association, £1.50) is the text of a speech of prominent Irish historian Peter Beresford-Ellis in 1995 which, strangely, the Connolly Association has taken two years to publish. It is, however, timeless as an analysis of Orangeism. “When we talk of the Orange Order we are not speaking of a movement whose philosophies have been cast in stone from the moment of its creation,” says Beresford-Ellis. He shows how over 200 years Orangeism has adapted from being anti-union with Britain to pro-union, the one constant being its virulent anti-Catholicism.
From the beginning, the Orange Order was organised along Masonic lines with the founders coming from such lodges. Back in 1799, over 450 members of the Irish House of Lords were members of the Order. It began as a High Tory conservative, sectarian and anti-revolutionary force opposed to the United Irishmen and determined to divide Catholic and Protestant, while initially excluding Dissenters from its ranks. Membership of the Order has fluctuated according to perceived reforms seen to be of benefit to the Catholics and the strength of nationalist and republican movements; its relationship with the British Crown has rocketed from high-ranking royalty being leading members to its attempt to stop Victoria being crowned Queen. Commenting on the Orange marches through Catholic areas, one of the most important symbols of the activities of the Order today, Beresford-Ellis likens them to “a dog marking its territory.”
For £1.50, the pamphlet is worth buying for the history lesson alone, and its analysis of just how dominant a force the Orange Order has been in the political life of the six-county statelet.
The BBC’s The Provos was one of the best-researched political programmes to be shown on British television There has surely never been a TV documentary with such access to those involved from the start in the Provisional IRA and the post-1969 republican movement. It was interspersed with interviews with leading Government and British military figures of the day. It allowed those involved to speak for themselves, but posed the tough questions if they tried to steer clear of controversial issues. Perhaps the most convincing interview was with the man who was a teenager when the “troubles” broke out. He was only concerned about the barricades at the top of his road because they had stopped the postman delivering his O Level results. The significance of his presence in the programme became clear when it developed that the British Army’s activities on his street led him to see the need for armed resistance and therefore to join the IRA.
The candour of the British Army officer who, like those in the IRA, showed a perception unusual in the British establishment because he too regarded the situation as war, was a refreshing break from the attitudes we are used to from the British press and many politicians. No way can a programme that showed the carnage that this did be said to be an apology for the republican movement, as some have described it. Its value is that it lets those involved explain their involvement, which, bearing in mind the recent gag on Sinn Fein politicians, was an achievement in itself. This was an all-too-rare offering from the BBC these days.